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Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under
Daubert And Joiner
by
DAVID L. FAIGMAN*

Introduction
"That's the reason they're called lessons, "the Gryphon remarked: "be-

cause they lessenfrom day to day. "1

In the Fall of 1997, the United States Supreme Court heard oral ar-

gument in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.2 This is a comment on that

case. Although it is not unusual to comment on Supreme Court cases, it
is perhaps a little unusual to do so before the decision is handed down.
The typical post-mortem either applauds the Court for a job well done, if
the scholar likes the result, or decries the outcome, if the scholar's position did not prevail. This Essay is rather different; it is, instead, a premortem. The advantage of writing before the decision is made, of
course, is that my judgment is unclouded by the Court's analysis. The
disadvantage lies in the possibility of a short shelf-life for the piece.
Having attended the oral argument in Joiner I am confident that the former advantage permits enough benefit to make the endeavor worthwhile
and that the latter disadvantage is not very likely.3 In truth, a postmortem differs from a pre-mortem only in the doctor's confidence that
the patient is dead. Their purposes, however, are the same. Both endeavor to identify lessons from one case in order to save others. That is
my objective here.
In Joiner, the Court confronts the question of what standard of review appellate courts should apply to trial court decisions regarding the
admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court will thus consider, for the
second time in five years, the scope of judges' responsibility for over* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1.

LEwis CARROLL,

ALICE'S ADVENTUREs

IN WONDERLAND

& THROUGH THE

LOOKING GLASS, ch.9 at 74 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981) (1865 & 1871).
2. 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
3. Although I had the pleasure of attending the oral argument in Joiner, I am not affiliated with any of the parties or amici who participated in the case.
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seeing the admission of scientific expert testimony. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,4 the Court held that federal trial court

judges have "gatekeeping" responsibilities when science comes to court.
Daubert requires trial judges to determine whether the scientific basis for
proffered expert testimony is more likely than not valid. This "validity
test," in practice, has generally increased trial courts' diligence in evaluating and excluding weak, sloppy or bad scientific expert testimony. In
Joiner, the Court will consider whether the active gatekeeping role established for trial courts in Daubert also extends to appellate courts. Unfortunately, a great deal of confusion swirls around the issue of appellate
review of scientific evidence. Much of this confusion comes from the
difficulty of fitting scientific evidence into the traditional evidentiary
boxes. The remainder of the confusion stems from judges' and lawyers'
limited understanding of the nature of science. The first source of confusion is relatively easy to address and resolve. It is the subject of this
brief Essay. The second subject will likely take many years to resolve.
It is the subject of a lifetime of work.
I. The JoinerCase
5

"Curiouserand curiouser!" criedAlice.
A. The Lower Courts' Opinions

"Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee, "ifit was so, it might be; and if
it were so, it would be: but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic. "6

In Joiner, the trial judge applied Daubert's gatekeeping requirement
and excluded the plaintiffs' proffer of medical testimony in a suit for
damages allegedly arising out of Robert Joiner's exposure to PCBs that
had been manufactured by the defendants (the other plaintiff in the case
was Karen Joiner, Robert's wife). 7 The plaintiff, a long-time cigarette
smoker, suffered from lung cancer and claimed that his exposure to PCBs
hastened the onset of the cancer. The trial court ruled that the experts'
opinions linking PCB exposure to promotion of lung cancer lacked scientific support and concluded that they could not testify. Without this
evidence the plaintiffs' suit collapsed and the trial court granted a motion

4.
5.
6.
7.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, supra note 1, ch.2, at 8.
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 1, ch.4, at 141.
Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326-27 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

July 19971

THE ORIGIN OF THE APPEAL IN AMERICA

the Wheelwright appeal, he had simply added an ambiguous "etc." to his
argument about the patent. 241 In A Short Story, Winthrop explicitly expanded the "etc.":
[N]either did an appeal lie from any Court in an County or Corporation
in England, but if a party will remove his cause to any of the King's
higher Courts, he must bring the King's Writ for it; neither did he tender any appeal, nor call any witnesses, nor desired any Act to be en242
tered of it.
Parallel to this common-law reservation argument, Winthrop also
advanced a common-law understanding of redress. If one wanted to remove a case, one had to bring a writ of error, not an appeal. If one had
failed to follow the proper procedures, then the appeal must never have
existed. Winthrop seemed to hope that he could define away the appeals. 243
All these technical common-law arguments, however, could not
convincingly disguise the fact that when Massachusetts refused to permit
appeals, it denied England's supreme authority. Winthrop's efforts did
not stop the English commissioners for foreign plantations from investigating the Gorton situation nor from showing interest in another group of
dissenters who wrote the Child Remonstrance. 2 " The culture of appeal
was too strong to be distinguished or reinterpreted away.
Finally, in a 1646 petition to the English commissioners, Winthrop
abandoned the common-law arguments. Accepting the culture of appeal,
he confronted the issue of authority. He explicitly stated that the colony
recognized the supremacy of England. In an eerie historical twist, Winthrop referred to the Henrician Act of Appeals. Winthrop's petition
stated that "the records" showed the wisdom of "our ancestors" who
"acknowledged a supremacy in the bishops of Rome in all causes ecclesiastical, yet would not allow appeals to Rome." 245 Borrowing language
from the preface to the Henrician Act, the petition stated that appeals
"would be destructive of all government" because the colony would have

241. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supranote 149, at 241.
242. Winthrop, A Short Story, supra note 240, at 256-57.
243. Id. at 257.
244. The fear of the Gorton and Child appeals twice sent Edward Winslow to England. His
effort to stop Gorton's Hypocrisie Unmasked, did not address the appeals issue. EDWARD
WiNsLow, HYPocRIsiE UNMASKED,
A TRUE RELATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS AGAINST SAMUEL GORTON OF RHODE
ISLAND (The Club for Colonial Reprints 1916) (1646).
245. 2 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 312.
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to follow the "delinquents" to England "where the evidence and circumstances of facts cannot be so clearly held forth as in their proper place"
and the expenses would be great.2' If the Puritan leaders of Massachusetts were Henry VIII, then England could only be Rome. Winthrop
must not have thought much of the commissioners. The analogy betrayed
the precariousness of the argument-when Henry VIII had barred appeals, he had ended the supremacy of Rome.
However, Massachusetts had acknowledged English authority and
the commissioners returned the favor by writing a response which
seemed to support Massachusetts' practice. In 1647, the commissioners
responded, "[W]e intended not.., to encourage any appeals from your
justice."247 The commissioners added that they did not intend to "restrain
the bounds of your jurisdiction to a narrower compass than is held forth
by your letters patent" and that they would "leave you with all that freedom and latitude that may in any respect, be duly claimed by you."248
Both comments left open whether the patent implicitly reserved appeals.
Nonetheless, Massachusetts took the response as a sign that the denial of
appeals was compatible with English supremacy. Into the 1660s, the colony would proclaim its ability to deny appeals to England even as it clung
tight to the culture of appeal.249
In places as diverse as Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the appeal
survived with the help of people as ideologically different from one another as Williams and Winthrop. As numerous other incidents during the
1640s in Massachusetts and Rhode Island demonstrate, the appeal signified the acceptance of authority to such a degree that discussions of the
appeal provided a space to construct and recognize authority. American
Indians such as Pumhom used the appeal to indicate which colony's
authority they would temporarily recognize." 0 John Winthrop and the
246. Id.
247. Id. at 337.
248. Id. Hugh Peter mysteriously wrote Winthrop shortly before the answer of the commissioners that "[a]ppeals will hardly be overthrown" and that they should not be troubled by
such appeals. Letter from Hugh Peter to John Winthrop (May 5, 1647), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 157 at 159.
249. A 1661 General Court order stated that the governor and other officials in Massachusetts had "full power and authority" over "ecclesiastics and civils, without appeal." 4
MASSACHUSErTS RECORDS, supra note 150, at 24-25 (documenting an Act of the General
Court dated June 10, 1661).
250. Letter from William Arnold to the Governor or Deputy Governor of Massachusetts
(Aug. 15, 1648), in 5 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 246. The entire passage is worth
quoting:
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nine, in applying an especially stringent standard, used the wrong standard of review. They argued that Daubert invests gatekeeping responsibilities only in the trial court. Under traditional principles of evidence
law, they pointed out, appellate courts are deferential to evidentiary decisions by a trial court judge. Thus, rather than give scientific evidence a
"hard-look," they argued, the appellate court should reverse only if the
trial judge abused his or her discretion. Here, they insisted, the district
court did not abuse its discretion and thus the Eleventh Circuit should be
reversed.
Petitioners' amici offered a rather poor defense of good science.
These integrity-of-science forces generally view Daubert's gatekeeping
function as a stringent threshold requirement. But the appellate court
here applied a stringent appellate standard to permit what these forces
considered bad science. Hence, these nine generally argued that appellate courts should not apply a stringent standard, though district judges
should continue to do so under Daubert. Their general chagrin with the
Eleventh Circuit's lackadaisical reaction to bad science led them to condemn the decision in its entirety. This reaction, although understandable,
overlooks the bigger picture. The Eleventh Circuit's hard-look approach,
though it produced an incorrect ruling in the present case, is likely to lead
to salutary results in future cases. The best rule for ensuring the integrity
of science in the law should require active participation of appellate
courts in the process of evaluating the validity of scientific research.
The integrity-of-science forces missed the bigger picture. The arguments they advanced will likely lead, in the long term, to more bad
science and less scientific sophistication among lawyers and judges. I
share the goal of creating a process by which good scientific research can
be integrated into legal decision making. But by focusing on the somewhat idiosyncratic outcome in Joiner, these amici embraced a procedural
rule that will likely undermine rather than promote their goal. The remainder of this Essay argues for active appellate review, which is necessary to promote the sophisticated use of scientific research by courts.
IMl. Integrating Science into the Law
Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves.

21

Early in the oral argument in Joiner, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked
whether adopting an abuse of discretion standard might not mean that appellate courts would inevitably leave standing inconsistent district court
decisions on the same subject. Also at oral argument, several of the justices asked whether expert testimony was somehow different from ordi21.

CARROLL,

ALICE'S ADvENTURES INWONDERLAND, supra note 1, ch.9, at 68.
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nary testimony or evidence. After all, if scientific evidence is no different than ordinary evidence, the traditional abuse of discretion standard
should be applicable to both. It turns out that the concern implicit in the
Chief Justice's question provides the answer to the repeated query regarding what is so special, in an evidentiary sense, about science. Specifically, it is because aspects of scientific evidence sometimes transcend
individual disputes, and thus are likely to recur in different jurisdictions,
that appellate courts must have the power to resolve inconsistencies in
lower court decisions.
A.

The Division of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury
"I'llbe judge. I'll be jury," said cunning old Fury; "I'll try the whole
cause, and condemn you to death.,,2

The law divides responsibility for deciding most fact questions between the judge and jury, with a strong presumption that jurors will assume most of that responsibility. However, the rules of evidence regulate which facts reach the jury and these rules very often require judges
to determine certain preliminary facts in order to resolve evidentiary issues. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence create an exception to
the general prohibition against hearsay for so-called dying declarations.
Under this exception, a statement may be admissible only if the judge
first determines that the statement was "made under a belief of impending
death."' The exception for dying declarations does not apply unless the
judge first determines the existence of this "preliminary fact.'24 Examples abound of such preliminary facts embedded in the rules of evidence.' In Daubert, the Court effectively determined that the validity of
proffered scientific testimony was a preliminary fact.' On this reasoning, the determination of validity is a necessary precondition to the admission of scientific expert testimony and within the discretion of the
judge.

22. Id., ch.3, at 22.
23. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). Under Rule 804, the judge must also find that the declarant
is "unavailable" to testify. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
24. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
25. Other representative examples of preliminary facts that must be found by the judge
include whether a statement was "made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy" for the hearsay exclusion for co-conspirator statements to apply, FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E), and whether
a statement was made while "the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition [described]" in order for the excited utterance exception to apply. FED. R.
EvID. 803(3).

26. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.

July 1997]

APPELLATE REVIEW

Ordinarily, appellate judges defer to trial judges' findings regarding
preliminary facts. There is good reason for this traditional deference.
Virtually all preliminary facts concern matters that depend on the testimony of witnesses that the trial court sees and the appellate court can
only meet through the written record. For example, when the dying
declaration exception is at issue, a nurse's testimony about the circumstances of the declarant's death is likely to be essential to the necessary
finding. There is no reason to believe that appellate judges reading a
transcript of the testimony are better able to assess the relevant preliminary fact than the trial judge who heard the nurse's testimony. Indeed,
there is good reason to believe otherwise.
Scientific evidence, however, is quite different from the ordinary
preliminary fact. These differences nullify the trial court's preferred position. As the Daubert Court explicitly recognized, science presents special problems for deciding responsibility between judge and jury. In an
often-quoted passage describing this division, the Court stated as follows:
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.
Its overarching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.27

The problem, however, is that this statement is not very illuminating, especially from a scientific perspective, on where the judge's responsibility ends and the jury's begins. In science, methods and conclusions cannot be separated. For example, extrapolating from animal
studies to humans is sometimes warranted and sometimes not. But few,
if any, scientists would contend that the conclusion that humans are affected in a certain way can be divorced from the fact that animals were
studied in the underlying research. Scientists' conclusions ultimately depend on the strength of the methods they used to reach them. Evaluation
of methods and conclusions simply cannot be divided among different decision makers. Both judge and jury must consider the methods employed
by the researchers in order to appreciate the conclusions they reached.
Still, the decision must be divided in some fashion, and the only question
is how it might be divided so as to contribute to the wise use of science
while, at the same time, responding to the procedural requisites of the
law.

27. Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
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The Special Case of Scientific Evidence
It's as large as life, and twice as natural.28

Scientific evidence is applied science. Thus, the question of relevance and weight involves several layers of scientific work. In Joiner,
for instance, the evidentiary issue concerns both the general question of
whether PCBs are associated with lung cancer, as well as, assuming the
general question is answered in the affirmative, whether the particular
plaintiff's lung cancer is attributable to exposure to PCBs. Courts have
increasingly referred to these different issues as "general causation" and
"specific causation." These general and specific qualities will be found
in virtually all science that enters the courtroom.21 For example, the validity of DNA profiling can be considered generally, since it depends on
tenets of molecular biology and population statistics, and specifically,
since allegations that the police planted the defendant's blood at the scene
of the crime obviously confound test results. This general and specific
character of scientific evidence provides a possible solution to both the
question of how the responsibility between judge and jury should be divided under Daubert, as well as the question of what standard of appellate review should be established for scientific expert testimony in Joiner.
A judge's gatekeeping responsibilities should extend to the general
aspects of science or, in other words, those scientific questions that transcend the particular case. Hence, deciding whether epidemiological research sufficiently demonstrates an association between PCBs and lung
cancer should be part of the gatekeeping responsibility. Whereas, determining whether the treating physician's judgment is biased because of
expert witness fees, or whether the plaintiff's history of smoking is
longer than he testified, are questions largely for the jury. Similarly, the
question of the validity and reliability of PCR tests in DNA profiling
would be decided by the judge preliminarily, but the question of whether
the laboratory's relationship with the prosecutor's office tainted their
findings would be primarily for the jury to determine.
This insight should also guide establishment of the standard of appellate review. When the scientific evidence transcends the particular
case, the appellate court should apply a "hard-look" or de novo review to
the basis for the expert opinion. When the scientific evidence involves
facts specific to the particular case, the appellate court should defer to the
trier of fact below. Although ordinarily appellate courts should (and do)
28. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss, supranote 1, ch.7, at 182.
29. See generally David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal
Ball at the CourthouseDoor, Please: Exploring the Past, Understandingthe Present and Worrying About the Future of ScientificEvidence, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 1799 (1994).
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apply a deferential standard to evidentiary matters, there are compelling
reasons for applying heightened appellate review for scientific evidence
that transcends individual cases.
Scientific findings that transcend individual cases involve mixed
questions of fact and law. They contain substantial policy considerations
that appellate courts should be obligated to decide. The law's need for
scientific evidence often precedes science's ability to provide definitive
answers. Mistakes, therefore, are inevitable. Where the risks and costs
should lie for these mistakes is ultimately a policy determination. In this
way, answers to questions about whether an area of scientific evidence
has sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible is more akin to a policy judgment than whether a preliminary fact specifically articulated in an
evidentiary rule (e.g., "belief of impending death") has been met. In the
silicone implant litigation, for instance, current research is not conclusive
one way or the other about whether silicone implants cause connective
tissue disorders. The issue of what costs will be accepted for an error is
a legal policy judgment. Appellate courts do not traditionally defer to
lower courts' legal findings.
The general nature of some scientific findings makes them more like
"legislative facts" than "adjudicative facts." 3" Legislative facts, like the
general aspects of scientific evidence, are factual questions that pose the
complication of the possibility of inconsistent findings in the trial courts
that can only be reconciled on appeal. Also, just like legislative facts,
scientific questions that transcend particular cases have a strong legal or
policy component. Hence, for both legislative facts and general science
facts, a strong deferential standard on appeal inevitably will create inconsistencies and complications. Although the Supreme Court has yet to
specifically adopt a non-deferential appellate standard for legislative
facts, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that any other rule would pose
serious difficulty. He explained why:
[Respondent] argues that the "factual" findings of the District Court and

the Eighth Circuit... may be reviewed by this Court only under the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
Because we do not ultimately base our decision today on the invalidity
of the lower court's "factual" findings, we need not decide the "standard of review" issue. We are far from persuaded, however, that the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of "legislative" facts at issue here. The difficulty with applying such a standard to "legislative" facts is evidenced here by the fact that at least one

30. In a couple of articles, Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker first identified
the "legal" nature of factual questions that transcend particular disputes. See John Monahan &
Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and EstablishingSocial Science in the
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:

A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
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other Court of Appeals, reviewing the same social science studies as
has reached a conclusion contrary to that
introduced by [Respondent],
31
of the Eighth Circuit.
If scientific-factual disputes are removed from appellate scrutiny,
contradictory results are sure to follow, but with no mechanism to cure
them. For instance, in the silicone implant litigation, among the nearly
100,000 cases nationwide, many of these cases are being litigated in
Portland, Oregon, while others are being tried in Montgomery, Alabama.
Judge Jones in Portland has already concluded that the scientific evidence
does not support expert testimony that the implants cause autoimmune
disorders. 32 Judge Pointer in Montgomery now has a panel of experts
studying the same issue and will decide the matter sometime early next
year. Suppose Judge Pointer permits the science to go to trial. A plaintiff's ability to bring suit and possibly recover millions of dollars will thus
turn on whether she happened to live in Alabama rather than Oregon.
Justice should not depend on such fortuity. Only appellate courts are in a
position to impose order on trial courts that decide similar cases differently.
Simply put, the scientific fact of the matter is the same wherever it
occurs for questions that transcend particular disputes. Hence, the association between silicone implants and connective tissue disorder is the
same in Montgomery, Alabama as it is in Portland, Oregon. Similarly,
the general validity of polygraph tests does not change whether they are
employed in New York or in San Francisco. Appellate courts are the
only arenas available for settling scientific disputes that transcend individual cases. Fairness requires that, where possible, like cases be treated
alike. Where general scientific issues such as whether bendectin causes
birth defects or electromagnetic fields cause leukemia are involved, a litigant's success should not depend on the vagaries of where the lawsuit
was brought. Appellate courts must take a hard-look at scientific evidence in order to ensure consistency across the lower courts.
An additional argument responds to the institutional competence issue that is at the core of the position that appellate courts should be deferential regarding scientific evidence. The reasons for deferring to a
lower court's preliminary fact finding, however, are not present when the
scientific question transcends the particular dispute. Good scientific research simply does not depend on the credibility of individual witnesses.
31.

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-69 n.3 (1986)(internal citation omitted); see

also Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Reavley, J.).
32. Hall v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1414-15 (D. Or. 1996). The
court concluded that there was insufficient scientific support and granted the defendants' motion
in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony, and provisionally granted summary judgment pending the findings of the Rule 706 panel in Judge Pointer's court in Alabama. Id.
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If the question is whether the declarant made a statement under a belief of
impending death, the nurse's credibility might be critical, and this presumably can best be assessed in person. In contrast, whether a series of
six epidemiological studies support the conclusion that the relative risk
associated with silicone implants exceeds 2.0 for connective tissue disorders does not entail the same sort of credibility assessment. The science
must be evaluated on the merits and as reported, in most cases, in the literature.
Contrary to the arguments against appellate courts' competency, arguably appellate judges are better positioned than trial judges (and trial
judges better than juries) to decide scientific disputes that transcend particular cases. In areas that recur often, such as DNA profiling, or that
involve a large number of claims, such as silicone implants, appellate
courts have the luxury of time and distance to become familiar with the
complex science. Very often the same or similar issues will arise in
multiple cases, so expertise gained once will be available when the issue
returns. Once a judge understands multiple regression analysis he or she
need not learn it again when it arises in another context. In addition, appellate judges sit on panels and thus have the benefit of shared experience
and expertise. The more academic character of appellate judging, therefore, is particularly well-suited to understanding and deciding general
scientific issues.
Conclusion
"The question is, " saidHumpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's
all. .33'

Active appellate review of scientific research that transcends particular cases is mandated by both legal and scientific reasons. By necessity, appellate courts must have the wherewithal, the gatekeeping power,
to settle scientific disagreements among lower courts. This will be true
for all scientific questions that transcend particular litigation, from the
validity of DNA profiling to the toxicity of PCBs. Case specific issues,
however-such as allegations that evidence was planted at the scene of
the crime, or that the expert is puffing for a fee-would remain matters
on which appellate courts would defer to the fact-finder at trial. But only
appellate courts are situated to ascertain and balance the policy implications raised by the science, to ensure consistency across jurisdictions, and
to evaluate the methods, principles and reasoning of multiple research
studies.

33.

CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING

GLAss, supra note 1, ch.6, at 169.

